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Jihad to Protect God and His Laws

In 1998, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and three other leaders of Islamic movements in Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh published a famous statement in *Al-Quds al-Arabi*, an Arab daily newspaper published in London, that seemed to voice a widely shared image of Islam under siege and a world at war.¹ The statement characterized American military operations in Muslim countries as 'a clear declaration of war on God, his messengers, and Muslims', and called on every capable Muslim to 'resist' and 'liberate' by fighting the Americans and their allies in jihad. Analysing such statements and perceptions, researchers have established that rhetoric invoking war and the perception of being under attack are common to various manifestations of violent religious activism.²

In this chapter, I look into the concept of defensive jihad as it is constituted in the narratives of two of the Taliban activists I interviewed in Pakistan, Muslim Khan and Matiul Haq. Though religious violence often has a more offensive dimension as well, as it is reflected in related narratives about the restoration of

order or justice that also incorporate religious imagery,³ the dominant tendency in the narratives displayed in this chapter is that they see a hostile enemy that is on a mission to attack Islam.

I have chosen to cluster Muslim Khan and Matiul Haq together due to their emphasis on their duty to defend and spread the laws of God, that is, sharia, and because they are both part of the broader TTP umbrella. I examine their perceptions of threat and the conditions under which they consider armed warfare to be an obligation for Muslims.

This chapter and the next two chapters are based on my interviews, whereas Chapter 5 is based on my analysis of Taliban recruitment materials. The chapters that are based on my interviews are like my analysis of the recruitment materials, illustrative of the larger trends I have identified in the Taliban narratives, but at the same time I try to introduce the readers to some of the activists that identify and sympathize with the banner of the Taliban.

Hence, the two interviews ahead (and my description of the interviews in the next two chapters) are not intended to provide a basis for a systematic comparative analysis of different Taliban groups or activists. Rather they provide the basis for enhancing a culturally sensitive understanding of the discourses of religion, defence, and justice that provide legitimacy to the Taliban use of violence.

Without exception, all the activists I interviewed explained their engagement in warfare as defensive. In most cases their definition of jihad also implied a struggle to establish an Islamic system characterized by the enforcement of a particular concept of sharia. The examples given ahead illustrate exactly how this defensive jihad discourse is constituted.

Although religion is placed within the defensive discourse, it also constitutes a parallel discourse that offers religious-ethical justification for a more offensive stance. At the same time, the invocation of religion places discursive and practical constraints on engagement in warfare through jurisprudential discourses

that set limits on the practice of jihad. The various roles of religion are examined in detail in Chapter 5, where I explain how religion serves both as a justification for jihad and a limitation, since it entails rules for discrimination and just war.

Muslim Khan: One of God's Guardians

The valley of Swat in northwestern Pakistan became known to the world when the schoolgirl Malala Yousafzai was shot in the head by Taliban gunmen while riding in a school bus in 2012. Muslim Khan, who was known as the 'Butcher of Swat' at the height of his TTP career, was part of the TTP leadership and the spokesman of the TTP Swat faction before he was arrested in April 2009. I interviewed him on his satellite phone shortly before his arrest and during the period when the TTP had taken control of Swat.

My conversation with Khan demonstrates the centrality of the concept of defence in the Taliban discourse on jihad. When I introduced myself and my interest in his reasons for embracing violence, he claimed: 'We have never attacked anyone unprovoked. They [the US] come and impose war on us.'⁴ In their conversations with me, Muslim Khan and other militants frequently invoked the image of Islam being under systematic attack.

When I asked Muslim Khan about how to stop the growing violence, he began by complaining that the Taliban view on this point would never be published, since the global media represents only the viewpoint of the US and European countries. He went on to stress that 'the simple solution to this war is that the European countries and the US forces take their armies out of here and return to the regions of the North Atlantic Ocean. Then I will give the world a hundred per cent guarantee that all these mujahedeen will go to sleep in peace and live peacefully.' Khan's perception of the conflict established a clear link between the military presence of the US and NATO forces on the one

hand and the jihad of the Taliban activists on the other. From his responses, I immediately sensed that the reason he had agreed to talk with me—a Muslim with Pakistani roots, born and raised in the West—was his frustration about being misrepresented in the Western media. To Khan and the other militants I talked to, it was clearly very important to stress that their war was justified.

Khan had been part of the TNSM movement's leadership since 1994. The TNSM was banned in 2002 by former president Pervez Musharraf following the US overthrow of the Afghan Taliban regime in November 2001, when between 5,000 and 10,000 TNSM followers including their leader Sufi Muhammad crossed into Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban against the US-led Coalition.⁵ The TNSM lost most of its cadres during US raids in Afghanistan.

Khan was appointed spokesman of the TTP Swat faction in 2008, when segments of the TNSM joined the TTP. He has often been cited in the Pakistani media as one of the authoritative representatives of the TTP. He was one of the fiercest critics of an anti-polio campaign organized by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2008. Khan publicly stated that anyone who became crippled or died of polio would become a martyr, honoured for refusing to take a vaccine containing forbidden materials (the vaccine, according to Khan, was derived from pig tissue). In the Pakistani media, he questioned the motives behind the vaccination campaign: 'There are other diseases also—like hepatitis, typhoid, etc. Why is everyone concentrating on polio? See, this is an American conspiracy.'⁶ His position was consistent with that of the TNSM leader Fazlullah (the leader of the TTP since 2013), who, in a radio sermon, deemed the immunization campaign a US conspiracy to make Pakistanis impotent and infertile.

The reason Khan originally joined the TNSM movement was, he explained, to implement sharia (*nifaze sharia*) in Pakistan. According to him, the purpose of the TTP and the TNSM was the same: 'Our aim is to establish the law of God in this country.

That was the reason why this country was established. The law the government has not implemented. We only want the system of Islam.'

'Muslims cannot stay Muslims without an Islamic system,' said Khan and argued that it is, therefore, a religious obligation (*farad*) for Muslims to establish a system like the one established by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hence 'those who engage in the struggle for an Islamic system' are the only true Muslims according to his viewpoint. Khan put this obligation on an equal footing with the five pillars of Islam: the declaration of faith (*kalma/shahada*), prayers (*namaz*), pilgrimage (*hajj*), the fast (*roza*), and giving alms (*zakaat*). Further, he was keen to convince me that:

To believe in other systems or base any decisions on other systems amounts to idolatry (*taghut*). This is why Allah is not accepting our [the Pakistani people's] deeds. In my opinion, this is like living as animals, or as the foreigners live, like the Jews live or like the Christians live. We are Muslims, and we only have one system with us, which is Islam.

Specifying what he meant by an Islamic system, he explained that 'our parties want a system which is based on the heavenly revelations. That means the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet. Not just for our sake, but there are benefits in it for everyone. The decisions that are based on such [a] system are both taken faster and bring inexpensive justice.' Thus for him, an Islamic system entailed the enforcement of sharia as the basis on which disputes are resolved and criminals punished.

The framing of sharia as a formalized justice and punishment system in turn is a very narrow interpretation of the concept and one of the main characteristics of the religious ideology of the Taliban. In public debates in the West, there is often an erroneous tendency to accept the Taliban's (and other extremist groups') very particular framings of religious concepts as representative of all believers. The interpretation of sharia is a vivid example. From the twelfth century onwards, sharia was conceived by the Sufis as a set of spiritual and ethical guidelines, in reaction to the

legalist interpretation of the concept maintained by the more orthodox class of the religious elite (the ulama).⁷ Although the Taliban's legalist interpretation is in one sense quite orthodox, their heavy emphasis on sharia as a system of quick and efficient public justice is a reading coloured particularly by the situation in the tribal belt of Pakistan.

According to Khan, the US attacked Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's embrace of sharia. I noticed that he did not mention 9/11 at all. The US, he explained, was on an offensive and aggressive mission to 'prevent every Islamic system from existing in the world'. For Khan, there was a fundamental doctrinal difference between Islam and other political systems. This difference was the real reason for the attacks by the enemies of Islam, whom he also described as the 'crusaders'. Hence Khan, like the other militants I spoke to, was convinced that US military actions in Afghanistan were part of an expansionist religious crusade.

Becoming increasingly eager to convince me about the real nature of the conflict, Khan stated: 'It is in reality a war between religions that Bush has started.' Even though he believed that militant jihad need not be only defensive, he kept stressing that the jihad fought by the Taliban (and other mujahedeen groups) was indeed purely defensive: 'History is witness that Muslims have always fought defensive wars.' Still, he argued, somewhat paradoxically, that the ultimate object of jihad is to 'bring about God's law on earth'.

During my conversation with Muslim Khan, I repeatedly found myself in a kind of verbal game in which I sought to turn him towards elaborating the 'offensive' dimension of his jihad, where the implementation of sharia was seen as mandatory for Muslims, while he tried to move the conversation towards the actions of the West and thus constitute his jihad as a defensive action. However, his specific interpretation of the duty of jihad remained conditioned by the US-led invasion of Afghanistan. Khan individualized the duty of jihad by making it incumbent on every Muslim. When there is no country in the world left

with a real Islamic system, he argued, no proper authority exists to declare jihad, as originally prescribed in Islamic jurisprudential literature.⁸ Without such an authority, according to his logic, jihad can be undertaken only if it is defensive, and 'in a defensive war every Muslim is obliged to participate, both men and women'.

During my conversation with Khan, he used the term '*jihad bil qital*'. The Arabic term '*qital*' means 'fighting', and this usage implies a distinction from other types of jihad, for example, '*jihad bin nafs*' (the jihad of the soul) or '*jihad bil lisan*' (the jihad by word). However, he used the word '*qital*' interchangeably with jihad, thus centring the jihad discourse on the militant struggle. By framing jihad as a response to an emergency and as an individual obligation, he distinguished the present struggle of the TTP from the quest to establish an Islamic system—though both, according to him, could in principle be part of jihad bil qital. At one point he argued that '*jihad bil qital* is to establish the Islamic system, and fight wars for that cause', which added a new dimension to his position that the current jihad was entirely due to the crisis created by the foreign invasion in Afghanistan. At the same time, he maintained that jihad to create an Islamic system is a collective duty (*fard al-kifaya*), albeit one that is not obligatory for every Muslim so long as a sufficient number of the community (the army) fulfils this duty. While he argued for offensive or system-transforming jihad as one meaning of the term, he also maintained that using force to create an Islamic system was allowed only at the instigation of a just imam. Khan's position contained some inherent inconsistencies, because he wanted to stress that his jihad was defensive while holding on to the premise that with a just imam, offensive jihad was legitimate. It remained unclear whether he considered Mullah Omar to be a just imam.

Despite the fact that the TTP had had several violent clashes with the Pakistani authorities and security forces, Muslim Khan insisted that the main problem was foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Thus he linked the

objectives of defending territorial borders (and thereby 'life and property') and political autonomy with the Islamic system that, according to him, was the main target of the US–NATO invasion. He also argued that the former American president George W. Bush launched the war for ideological reasons, because otherwise it would not make sense that 'the CIA-sponsored mujahedeen of yesterday suddenly are the terrorists of today'. He was referring to the Afghan militants who fought the Soviets with covert US support. From the Taliban's perspective, Muslim Khan stressed, '[t]here is after all no difference. Back then we were chasing out foreign occupation forces, and today we are chasing out foreign occupation forces.'

When we discussed the role of suicide tactics in jihad, he told me that he had 'no doubt' that they were legitimate means not only in a situation of desperation but also in other non-defensive situations, so long as they were accompanied by the right intention (*niyat*): 'to fight along the path of God and pave the way for His system.'

Niyat is a very powerful concept in Islamic theological discourse. It is traditionally regarded as the main premise for validating an action as pious. In the *Sahih al-Bukhari* volumes, the Prophet Muhammad is quoted in the very first Hadith as saying that 'actions are according to their intentions'.⁹ Another often-quoted Hadith (al-Qudsi)¹⁰ in Muslim legal literature from the same compilation begins in this way:

Allah has written down the good deeds and the bad ones. Then he explained it [by saying that] he who has intended a good deed and has not done it, Allah writes it down with Himself as a full good deed, but if he has intended it and has done it, Allah writes it down with Himself as from ten good deeds to seven hundred times, or many times over.

Many theologians and jurists (*fuqaha*) have elaborated on the concept of intention. Among the most notable is the twelfth-century scholar Al-Ghazali, who stressed the importance of a

clear intention accompanying ritual acts of worship. It is a widely accepted practice among Muslims to clarify their intentions, sometimes ritualized by a direct proclamation before prayers or a day-long fast. Generally, it has been interpreted to mean that a religiously wrong action can still be considered a pious act if it was carried out with the right intention. Conversely, right actions are regarded as worthless if they are carried out with the wrong intention (for example, greed or the desire for prestige). Relating to this, another widely cited Hadith from the Sahih Muslim compilation¹¹ narrates how the first three men in hell will be the mujahideen who seemingly fought for God but actually fought to be called brave warriors, the *qari* (reciter of the Quran) who seemingly spread the word of God but actually coveted the title of scholar, and the wealthy man who seemingly spent for religious causes but actually coveted the prestige of being called a generous man. Such conduct has also been considered a lesser form of shirk, because the purpose is not to serve God but rather to attract the attention of human beings.

Besides stressing the importance of a sincere niyat as the condition for lawful jihad, Muslim Khan further made a point of distinguishing between suicide, which he regarded as unlawful (haram) according to Islam, and self-sacrifice. Yet, although he argued that voluntary death was permissible in the fight against the enemies of Islam, he gave me no references to religious texts, maintaining only that the divine permission was 'clear' in the Quran and Hadith literature. He justified extraordinary measures such as suicide or self-sacrifice primarily by linking them to the importance of defending the Islamic system. The measures he was discussing (suicide, violence, and so on) were implicitly justified by the importance of the ideals he was defending (religion and the sovereignty of God). This means that Khan invoked both religious and security justifications (that Islam is under deadly attack) for such actions, invoking the latter when his theological arguments or references to religious texts were weak.

Matlul Haq: A Call for an Islamic System

My interview with Muslim Khan from the TTP shows how the security arguments, that is, the notion of being under attack and, therefore, justifying a violent response, are very strong. However, the idea that the Taliban need to protect God and his laws also had a more offensive dimension, which stressed to a higher degree the importance of implementing sharia. This dimension became clear to me when I interviewed Matlul Haq, the son of Sufi Muhammad, the original leader of the TNSM, based in the Swat valley. Though the TNSM existed in Pakistan even before 2001, a faction of it took up arms in Pakistan and joined the TTP under the leadership of Fazlullah, the son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad and a leader of the TTP umbrella. Matlul Haq was among the TNSM followers who joined the TTP under the leadership of Fazlullah, who at that point was leading the Swat chapter of the TTP.

Sufi Muhammad was convicted by the Pakistani government for fighting in Afghanistan after 2001. After his release in April 2008, he returned to Swat, advocating an end to militancy in the region, and openly criticized Fazlullah. However, Muhammad was arrested again in 2009, and by the end of 2010, four of his sons were also arrested and charged by an anti-terrorism court for various offences, including treason.¹² Among them was Matlul Haq, who also used to be the spokesperson of the TNSM.

My conversation with Matlul Haq was one of my most uncomfortable interviews. My use of the term '*khudkash hamlay*' (suicide attacks) instead of fidee attacks immediately put him into a defensive mode. Judging from his increasingly loud and aggressive tone of voice, I felt that he had stamped me as an outsider, a non-Muslim westerner. Some of his responses to my questions were outright scornful. When I asked him about what defines a Muslim, he exclaimed, 'Don't you know? Oh Lord!' followed by a guffaw that sounded as if he found my ignorance both tragic and ridiculous.

Although his father had criticized the violent means of Fazlullah and his followers, Matiul Haq did not reject the legitimacy of suicide attacks when I spoke with him. However, he corrected my use of the word 'suicide' (khudkash) to 'self-sacrifice' (fidayee) in order to stress that suicide is forbidden in Islam. His distinction was based on a differentiation between the possible intentions behind a suicidal act: if the intention is to fight the enemies of God, then the act is considered legal, whereas taking one's own life for selfish motives is unlawful. In his words:

Fidayee attacks against the *kaafir* [infidel] are completely legal, not only legal in Islam but also dominant [as an idea] in Islam. But when Muslims use this method against other Muslims, then it is haram. I am saying that in a confrontation with a *kaafir*, you cannot call these suicide attacks. When Muslims attach bombs to their bodies and go to the *kuffar*, then we call it *fidayee* in our language. This is completely justified in the Quran and the Hadith, from the *sahaba karam* [early 'honourable' followers of the Prophet Muhammad], and from the *fuqaha*.

Haq's argument for the legitimacy of extraordinary means such as *fidayee* attacks depends not only on the intention but also on the target. Thus the justification is based more on the nature and scale of the threat than on the nature of what is being defended.

According to Haq, the original aim of the TNSM was to establish 'God's system' on Pakistani soil. He invoked the idea that Islam has six different sectors, encompassing 'a system of law, a system of politics, a system of economy, private life, society, and education': according to Haq, it constitutes a holistic and comprehensive ideology for conducting not only private but also public and political-legal matters. He declined my requests to be more specific, and I believe that he judged that I, as an outsider, would not understand anyway.

When I asked him about how the conversion to an Islamic system would happen, he said that it should be done by proselytizing jihad (*dawa*). At the same time, he stated that there are three conditions for the successful establishment of an Islamic

system: first, Muslims unite against their enemies; second, they boycott foreign systems; and third, they initiate jihad against those who are trying to prevent it. In his view, the present Pakistani government is an accomplice of the enemies of Islam because it has embraced a foreign system, namely democracy. He argued that 'the present government came with democracy, and whatever it then does is non-Islamic and against sharia'. This legitimizes a violent course of action against government representatives and security forces, which is especially embraced by the followers of Fazlullah. Thus militant jihad is framed as a necessary step towards establishing a true Islamic system.

During the interview Haq suddenly changed his rhetorical tone and voiced a call to all Muslims to abandon 'the Western democratic way' and 'hold on to the Islamic way'. I sensed that at that moment he had come to regard me as a potential ally, a channel for broadcasting his views to fellow Muslims. The shift made it very clear that it was hard for him to conceive of any middle ground between being a hostile outsider and a loyal follower. Although this made me uncomfortable, I didn't protest but continued listening.

The Islamic way, he explained, was demonstrated during the five years of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, which he described with words such as 'peace' and 'order'. In contrast, the proponents of other 'worldly and secular systems', most notably the US, were associated with images of 'war and destruction', and described as idolaters (*mushrikeen*). Contrasting the Taliban regime with Afghanistan's long history of conflict, Haq argued that 'in the five years when the Emirate Islamiyya [the Islamic Emirate] was established, the country was peaceful. Then the US came. They have removed all peace and order. This is a clear example in front of you.' 'The secular governments came and removed all peace and order,' he said.

In his defence of 'God's system', Haq quotes a Hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad is reported to have said: 'Do jihad against the idolaters through your money, body, and

tongue. Spend money in the cause of God, use your body in the service of religion, and use your tongue to speak against false systems.' In his justifications of the actions and ideology of the TNSM movement, he frequently invoked such sayings of the Prophet, along with references to Hanafi jurists who have interpreted the sources of jurisprudence (notably Hadith literature and the Quran) as a formalized set of rules. The same is true of his explanations of the TNSM's embrace of militant jihad (jihad bil qital).

Matiul Haq's call for jihad bil qital does not immediately appear to be part of the same narrative as his vision of establishing an Islamic system, though they are linked. He casts militant jihad in mainly defensive terms, presenting a snapshot of 'history' as evidence: 'History can witness that we are fighting for our defence. In Afghanistan we were attacked by the US; here in Pakistan they come and call us terrorists in different areas. But here, too, we are fighting in defence, because the army is attacking us. They attack innocents. When people fight back, it is nothing else but defence.' This reasoning helps to explain Haq's sharp reaction to the common designation of the TNSM as a terrorist movement: 'If terrorism means that a Muslim is fighting for his rights to establish the system of God, and sacrifice whatever he can in this endeavour, then ok, we are indeed terrorists. If terrorism means to kill and attack innocents, then we are not that kind of terrorists. We are only asking for our rights. This should not be called terrorism.'

Thus Haq's narrative on the necessity of jihad bil qital was based on the defence of two elements: first, the sovereignty (of Afghanistan); and second, the 'right to establish the system of God', which amounts to the defence of religious-political autonomy. However, the defence of sovereignty was also linked to the defence of religion and an Islamic system. For instance, throughout our conversation Haq referred to Afghanistan as the Emarate Islamiyya and stated that the only true Islamic system in modern history has been 'under the Taliban in Afghanistan'.

By implication, the offensive, system-transforming mode of jihad and defensive jihad are not as distinct as he initially asserted.

Haq also invoked religion to explain the motives of the threats to 'Islamic sovereignty and autonomy'. As in my other conversations with Taliban adherents, he believed the enemy to be acting with ideological and religious motives, driven by 'their struggle ... to wipe out Islam from the world'. These enemies of Islam are identified as an unholy alliance of the unbelievers, the Jews, and the Christians (kuffar, *jahood*, and *ansar*).

By this point in our conversation I had apparently managed to signal that I was not a stranger to Islamic vocabulary or religious traditions, and Haq increasingly referred to the conflict in religious and mythical terms. He explained the invasion of Afghanistan in apocalyptic terms, citing what he called a prophecy of Muhammad that the unbelievers, the Jews, and the Christians would try to demolish Islam: 'It is their misperception that this will ever happen. The Prophet has told us that there will come a time when the Jews and the Christians will become the slaves of Islam. It is their misperception that Islam will be demolished.' He invoked similar reasoning and analogies to explain the actions and decisions of the TNSM (that is, the rationale for engaging in jihad bil qital). His religious discourse was parallel rather than complementary to the security discourse, in which violent action was framed as a necessary response to assaults on sovereignty and on religious-political autonomy. However, these two discourses at times seemed to merge when he equated the defence of sovereignty and autonomy with the defence of God's system.

The main aspect of 'God's system' that militants like Haq seek to implement is the enforcement of sharia. The Swat district of the Malakand Division in the KPP has been a battleground for sharia, and as mentioned earlier, it was for a long time a stronghold of the TNSM, which was created in the early 1990s in the name of implementing sharia. The TNSM was inspired by Ahl Hadith influences and also by the JI's call to implement sharia.

The movement arose in response to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's imposition of a new, controversial system of tribal law in the area. Although its leadership was not intellectual like the JI's, the TNSM called for sharia as the proper replacement for the tribal law system.¹³ After a series of violent clashes, it succeeded in its goal: a sharia ordinance, also known as the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, was implemented in Malakand in 2009.¹⁴ This was the result of a peace deal signed on 21 May 2008 between Mullah Fazlullah and the Pakistani government. Fazlullah promised to cease attacks on Pakistani security forces and other government installations in the area, to deny shelter to foreign militants in the Swat region, and to dismantle his militia. The Pakistani government in turn agreed to release Swat militants from jail, to implement sharia in the entire region, to establish an Islamic university in Iman Dehri, and to withdraw troops from Swat.¹⁵

However, none of the parties upheld their agreement, and the Pakistani government launched a new military operation in Khyber Agency and arrested leading TTP militants in the KPP on 28 June 2008.¹⁶ That summer, the Swat militants increased their attacks on government installations and girls' schools: they destroyed more than 125 girls' schools in 2008.¹⁷ The situation in Swat escalated further after an attempted takeover of Buner, a district near the capital of Pakistan. The fighting between government forces and the Swati Taliban created over two million internally displaced refugees. The Pakistani army claimed that close to 1,600 militants and 90 soldiers had been killed since the fighting began.¹⁸ After this incident, Fazlullah escaped to Afghanistan, where he launched his war against the Pakistani military. He returned to Pakistan in November 2013 in order to take over the leadership of the TTP. Fazlullah is part of the Yousufzai tribe from Swat and the first non-Mehsud leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Since his takeover, he has struggled to impose his authority on the powerful tribe that dominates large parts of the tribal areas.

Notes and References

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2. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *The Fundamentalism Project: Fundamentalisms Comprehended*, Vol. 5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
3. See, for example, Mark Juergensmeyer, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008).
4. All quotations from activists in this and the following sections are my own translations.
5. Muhammad A. Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, *Al-Qaeda Fights Back: Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas* (Islamabad: Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2007), p. 123. See also Ahmed Rashid, 'A Dangerous Void in Pakistan', *Yale Global Online*, 4 March 2009, available at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/dangerous-void-pakistan> (accessed on 1 June 2011).
6. Cited in Ayesha Akram-Nasir, 'Polio-Free Pakistan: Only a Dream?', *Daily Times* (Pakistan), 14 September 2008, available at www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\09\14\story_14-9-2008_pg13_7 (accessed on 1 October 2015).
7. Sufism is a broad category that covers many different orders and movements in the world, historically and today, but overall the term denotes the mystical-ascetic aspect of Islam. It is often highlighted as an alternative to the legalist approach to Islamic teachings, and one of its main tenets is that the practitioners of Sufism strive to obtain direct experience of God by making use of intuitive and emotional faculties.
8. The primary sources for the rulings on jihad (*ahkam al-jihad*) have traditionally been the Quran and reports of the practice of Prophet Muhammad. Early jurists like Imam Malik (d. 795), Abu Yusuf (d. 795), and al-Shaybani (d. 804) wrote longer works on the concept of jihad. Al-Shafi (d. 820) and al-Tabari (d. 923) rendered opinions on the conduct of war and of statecraft. They established precedents that were developed in turn by scholars like al-Sarakhsi (d. 1096), al-Mawardi (d. 1058), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and a

host of others. Some of the most authoritative statements about the demand for a just imam (*imam al-adil*) are made by Imam Ridha and Shaykh Tusi.

9. The Sahih al-Bukhari is one of the six canonical Hadith compilations in Sunni Islam. They were collected by Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari after being transmitted orally for generations. A translation by M. Muhsin Khan is available at <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/bukhari/> (accessed on 25 July 2014).
10. *Hadith al-Qudsi* is a category of Hadith literature containing the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. In orthodox tradition these are regarded as coming directly from God.
11. The Sahih Muslim is another of the six canonical Hadith compilations within Sunni Islam. The Hadith were collected by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. Abdul Hamid Siddiqui has translated the entire compilation into English. The translation is available at <http://www.usc.edu/org/cmje/religious-texts/hadith/muslim/> (accessed on 25 July 2014).
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